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PROGRESS  WITH HARMONIZATION/CONVERGENCE/COMPATIBILITY:
U.S.  AND  CANADIAN  GRAIN MARKETING  SYSTEMS
Don McClatchy
In  the  wake  of  the  U.S./Canada  Joint  Commission  on  Grains  (1994-96)  and
considerable recent and continuing re-examination in Canada of its Western grains marketing
system (1996-97),  it may be useful to try to assess what the key bilateral agenda items for
H/C/C in grains marketing will be for the next few years.
Many issues have been discussed in this area over recent years but it seems that these
issues  now  fall into three  groups.  The first  of these  groups  I would characterize  as the
"chaff'.  It includes several  different accusations about the effects of the Canadian Wheat
Board  (CWB)  which,  despite  being  argued  and  analysed  at  length,  have  never  been
demonstrated substantively or conclusively  to hold water, and I do not think they ever will.
These issues  serve to divert  attention,  energy  and resources  from  the more  fundamental
problems, in my view.
The  second group  contains  issues which are being addressed  and on which steady
progress seems to be being made, and can be expected to continue.  They might be thought
of as the "grist  on which the mill is currently  grinding".
Of most concern to me are the issues in the third group.  These I foresee as posing the
biggest problems  for the  future.  They  are  key  outstanding issues  on which  little  or no
progress  in resolution has yet been made.  To push the analogy  further,  they are perhaps
closest to stones which, if not removed, threaten to break the machinery and bring the whole
process to a crisis point.236  Proceedings
GROUP  1: THE CHAFF
CWB Price Discrimination (spatial)
The CWB  is a monopoly buyer  but not a monopoly seller.  Furthermore,  it has no
inherent powers (other than requiring that a cargo be shipped to an indicated  destination) to
effectively separate the markets into which  it is selling, as the successful price-discriminating
monopolist  must have.'  Despite  its  own periodic  domestic  claims  to  the  contrary,  and
notwithstanding the results of recent studies commissioned  by the Board, I remain persuaded
that the opportunities  for the CWB to increase  total market returns  by pricing differentially,
in order to take advantage of differences in the slopes of  the demand curves for the Canadian
product which  it faces, are probably  quite  limited.2 What seems to be more common  and
important  is that the CWB offers  competitive prices in certain separated export markets in
order to maintain a presence in those markets (perhaps  for longer-term strategic reasons) and
in so doing may accept lower-than-opportunity-cost  returns in those markets in the current
period.  In  this  sense  of competitive  (though  not  necessarily  profit-maximising)  price
discrimination, the CWB is effectively  doing the same thing as other major grains exporters,
the EU,  the  United States  and Australia.  The  United  States  claims  to  price down  in
certain  targeted markets (using the EEP)  in order  to allow U.S. suppliers  to be competitive
with EU exporters subsidised  with 'restitutions'.  The CWB  follows to remain competitive
with the United  States and  the EU.  In the absence  of EU and U.S.  export subsidies there
would be no  incentive for the CWB  to price  lower in such markets,  in order to be able to
retain  a share  (the case  in the  1995-96  period).  The  answer to this problem  is to get rid of
the targeted, discriminatory  export subsidy programs, not the CWB.
Price Leadership  (in time)  by the CWB
Statisticians seem to have  run wild in recent years trying to prove this  one.  Implicit
in reported studies and their  interpretations  seem to be presumptions that there is (or must
be)  a  price leader,  that related  industrial economic  theories  have  relevance  for the  world
wheat market,  that one  country has an incentive  to lead market prices up or down, and that
such price  leadership  would be necessarily  disadvantageous  to other  exporting countries.
Discussion of economic rationale  has been largely  absent from studies I have seen.
Such arbitrage-preventing  separation on world wheat markets may exist, but not due to the
existence of the CWB.
2  The most  obvious  exception  to  this  is  the Japanese  market,  where  Japan's  policy  of
diversifying its supplies implies  much lower elasticity in the Japanese demand for Canadian wheat
(at least over a certain range)  than that facing the CWB in  most other markets.  Another example
may be a significantly lower demand elasticities for Canadian  barley in various  malting markets than
those in  feed markets.
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A reasonable  empirical statistical  case for CWB price leadership  seems to be now
confined  to hard  spring and  durum  wheats.  A higher  CWB share  of total world market
supplies for these types lends  some plausibility  to this, but also suggests a motivation  for
price  leadership  lying  simply  in  a  better  knowledge  of  current  world  market  supply
conditions and a consequent better appreciation of the way prices need to move in order to
achieve  market  clearance.  I personally remain  sceptical that the CWB  can really do  this
forward price discovery job better than the big U.S. grains exchanges,  and that it does in fact
lead them  for some wheat types.  Both types of institution must also anticipate  future levels
of key policy parameters (e.g., EEP),  and I don't believe that the CWB has an advantage  in
this.
Rather,  I remain  persuaded that the main price  discovery  for world  grain  markets
occurs  on the Minneapolis,  Chicago and Kansas City exchanges, whose participants  are as
well informed  as the  CWB about the current state of world market prices, and, in the event
of good harvests, about how  far prices may have to drop in order to clear the market.  I see
no incentive for the CWB to lead prices below market-determined levels.
CWB quotes  are claimed to follow the daily Minneapolis prices.  This claim could,
I think, be easily tested.  To  my knowledge  it has  not been refuted.  The Achilles heel of
virtually all statistical analyses to date lies  in their use of these quotes,  which are not actual
sales  prices, just as reported  fob  Gulf or West Coast  Ports prices  are  not actual net sales
prices  in  particular  markets.  There may  be some  scope  for  statistical  analysis  of price
changes over time in particular markets to test the arguments in the previous section.  To my
knowledge,  this has not yet been attempted,  and would have to overcome the difficulties  of
obtaining actual  sales prices  (adjusted  for particular terms and conditions)  from both the
private sector grain companies  and the CWB.
Canadian Price Premiums
It is recognized  and accepted  that these exist in many markets, have done for a long
time, and derive from a reputation for a reliable grading system providing a high degree of
consistency  in quality.  This grading system is provided by the Canadian Grain Commission,
which now operates on a full cost recovery  basis.  Naturally Canada wants to preserve this
reputation  and the premiums  it generates.  Apart from the direct costs associated with the
grading  system, there may have been some indirect costs to Canadian  producers  over the
years because of the limited number of varieties  which have been licenced  in an effort to
ensure purity in the product.  There is no evidence,  however, that the premiums derive  from
unfair practices  by the  CWB.  Furthermore,  it is erroneous,  in my view, to attribute these
consistency/reliability  premiums to CWB pricing practices  or the existence of the single desk
seller,  rather  than  to the  Canadian  grading  system.  I  acknowledge  the possibility  of a
relatively  small additional  component of the  'Canadian premium'  which  derives  from  a
superior quality of'service' provided by the CWB as a seller, but remain sceptical about such
claims.
McClatchy 237238  Proceedings
Inadequacies of the CWB in Meeting  the Needs  of Canadian Producers
Arguments have at times appeared from U.S. academic  and other sources suggesting
that  the  CWB  pooling  system  may  have  some  costs  as  well  as benefits  for  Canadian
producers.  My impression is that most prairie grain  growers understand this quite well, and,
as a result, there is a very intense  ongoing debate about such questions in Canada.  However,
as long as the subject  is confined to relative costs and benefits for Canadians, then this is a
domestic  matter,  to  be  resolved  in  Canada.  In  my judgement,  efforts  by  outsiders  to
influence the outcome of this debate could prove counterproductive.
Canadian Grain Displacing  U.S.  Grain From The U.S.  Market
It has now been amply analyzed,  demonstrated  and explained  that such departures
from  more  traditional  Canadian  grain  export  patterns happen  in  response  to incentives
provided by price differentials when use of the EEP drives a wedge between U.S. domestic
prices  and world  market prices.  In  other words,  they  are  a product  of classical  market
arbitrage.  With  no  tariffs,  the  U.S.  market  automatically  becomes  more  attractive  to
Canadian  exporters  than other export markets at such times.  The basic problem here lies
with the internal  inconsistency of the U.S.  policy package.  Export subsidies  don't work
unless backed up by some border barrier.  The problem  is not the existence of the CWB, nor
are there hidden  Canadian subsidies involved.  In fact the problem would have been worse
in the absence of the CWB; the single desk seller was able to apply some restraint which may
not have resulted from a deregulated marketing situation.
Canadian Grains Exports Increased by CWB System
The job  of the CWB  is to market  all grain which is produced  in Western  Canada.
Exports are the residual after domestic needs  are met.  Since the elimination of  the 'two-price
wheat' policy some years  ago, the actions  of the CWB have not been a factor in Canadian
consumption  levels.  If the claims of the CWB,  that it can extract better average prices  for
growers  from the world market than could an unregulated market, are true, then I suspect that
the magnitude of the benefit is only marginal.3 When  a small price benefit is applied to a
very low price elasticity of supply, then the production impact must be very small.  Similarly,
such  other  Canadian  subsidy programs  as  still exist generally  apply to  all western  crops
equally, and so do not perceptibly  distort the allocation of the fixed land base, or stimulate
production of some individual crops relative to others.  I conclude that the CWB marketing
3  conclude that the CWB could only affect the quantity of Canadian exports by achieving
better market returns (producer prices) and thus stimulating  production.  Accepting  this leads to an
inconsistency  between  the arguments  of some  CWB  critics,  who  argue  that  the CWB  boosts
Canadian  exports,  and arguments  of others  that the CWB  undercuts  and/or drives down market
prices,  which  would imply lower  returns for Canadian  farmers and  hence lower  production  and
exports.
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system  has  very  little,  if any,  impact  on  the  quantities  of Canadian  grains  produced,
consumed and exported.
GROUP 2: THE GRIST
Grain Grading, Standards and Description Differences
Both countries' systems have their strong points.  The need for progress towards more
compatibility,  in order that a single North American market might function effectively,  is
well recognised and steady progress is being made.  Superimposed  on this is the recognition
of  the need for flexibility of specifications  to meet the special needs of individual customers,
and for new, more refined techniques of measuring quality characteristics to be adopted as
they are developed and become available.  There appears to be good bi-national cooperation
on this activity.
Equal Access  to Each Others' Grain Markets and Marketing Infrastructure
End use certificates  are still in place on both sides of the border, but have little effect
in restricting access (with the possible exception of small lots  in local border areas).  Full
two-way  access  to millers  and  to  feed  markets  effectively  exists  now.  Canada's  main
remaining concern is to keep U.S.  grain out of the country elevator system,  in order to avoid
visually-indistinguishable  lower-quality  (or  more  variable  quality)  grain  contaminating
Canadian export supplies.  U.S. grain can and has moved on the Canadian rail  system, and
through Canadian terminal elevators and ports.  Similarly,  Canadian grain has begun moving
on  the  Mississippi  waterway  system  and  on  the  U.S.  rail  system.  Such  cases  will
undoubtedly become more  frequent and accepted as normal.
Lengthening the Arm between  the Canadian Government  and the CWB
Clearly this needs to happen,  as international  opposition will continue as long as the
CWB is seen to be to some degree under the control of the Canadian Government.  There is
also considerable  domestic pressure  in this direction and  some progress  is evident.  New
legislation recently  tabled  changes the control  structure  to some extent.  Commissioners
would be replaced with a more traditional  CEO/Board of Directors structure with the policy
intent of having a majority of the Board elected by producers and a minority appointed by
government.
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GROUP 3: THE STONES
These are issues on which  little progress is yet evident, and which will probably need
to be the main points of focus in future discussions  and negotiations,  in my view.  In some
cases (particularly  CWB Transparency  and Domestic Floor Price  Supports which follow)
there is need and scope for intellectual  input, in the form of good objective analysis, to assist
progress.
EEP
This program will be an irritant as long as it remains.  I recognize that its removal will
probably have to be in the context of the phasing out of EU export restitutions  on grains.
CWB Transparency
The bulk of evidence suggests that less is generally known about the prices, terms and
conditions of CWB sales than about corresponding  private sector sales.  The CWB argues
that,  given the nature of the world grain market and the way many importing countries prefer
to do business, it can do better for its producers by operating confidentially.  This may well
be true.  The problem is that in the eyes of other countries who wish to change the  structure
of the international  grain market to make it more open and transparent, the CWB facilitates
the status quo and  is therefore  an obstacle  to progress.  As  long the secrecy  remains,  the
perception of a possibility of unfair trade practices will be there and the CWB will remain
an  international target.
Domestic  Floor Price Supports
It may be argued  that both CWB initial prices  and U.S.  loan rates  are equivalent  in
that they provide a price  floor, financed  as necessary by taxpayers  (CWB pool deficits,  and
CCC  purchases  of grain  forfeited  under the  non-recourse  loan system),  which has  been
managed at quite low (well below market)  levels in recent years.  Nevertheless,  there is fear
on both sides of  the border that the other's discipline could be arbitrarily relaxed at any time,
turning one or the other instrument  into a significant  subsidy, and tilting the playing  field.
Conceptually,  there would seem  to be a possibility  to formally  link these  two  measures.
Ideally,  it  could be jointly agreed  to harmonize  the  levels  of the  U.S.  loan  rate  and the
Canadian initial payment  and only to change them by mutual consent.  If that would be an
unacceptable  erosion  of U.S.  sovereignty,  then  Canada  could still  choose to unilaterally
follow any U.S. lead in this respect.  Then, in deciding to change  its loan rate, the U.S. would
at  least have to presume  that Canada  would  follow  suit  (and  that  any  down sides  to the
decision may therefore be exacerbated).  There  may even be more widespread  international
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interest  in the idea of a coordinated low-slung safety  net, where international pressures could
be expected to keep  it low in all countries.
Disciplines  on Legislated  Monopolies
It is clear that State Trading Enterprises  are going to be a focus of  attention in the next
round of multilateral trade negotiations.  In the eyes of the United States  and a  few other
countries  they are  an important  object of unfinished  business  left over from the  Uruguay
Round.  One  important  question  will be whether  single  desk  importers  and  single  desk
exporters  should be treated symmetrically,  or whether separate and distinct disciplines  are
needed for each.  My comments are restricted to exporting  STEs.
The right of producers to band together to market cooperatively  is not at issue; such
forms  of agricultural marketing exist in most countries and enjoy wide  support.  When the
institution involved is an agency of government or a parastatal, then the potential undesirable
effects  are  relatively  clear  and  it seems  likely that  some international  disciplines  will be
agreed to curb such effects.  The most difficult case may be the intermediate  one of legislated
monopolies  (e.g., marketing cooperatives)  which, aside from the underpinning  legislation,
operate  quite independently  of government.  Whether  and why  international  disciplines
would be appropriate  in such cases,  and, if so,  what sorts of disciplines,  may become  the
toughest issue for the STE negotiators to address.  The outcome will be crucial to the future
of the CWB which can relatively  easily be made more independent of the Government,  but
which regards  its purchasing monopoly status as essential to its survival.
U.S.  Export Credit Guarantees
As long as the credit guarantees  offered under the GSM programs  exceed in length
of term the norms agreed by virtually all other countries (3 years for grains; more generally,
the life  of the product),  then this is going to remain a source  of bilateral  and international
irritation.
CONCLUSIONS
I conclude from the above that both the United States and Canada have some bullets
to bite unilaterally which would further the cause of H/C in grain marketing.  There  is room
for coordinated joint action on at least the issue of floor price support.  A cooperative rather
than confrontational  approach to the  STE disciplines  issue may also pay dividends  for both
countries.
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